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Abstract  
The paper argues that the microfoundations programme can be understood as an implementation of 
an underlying methodological principle, methodological individualism, and that it therefore shares a 
fundamental ambiguity with that principle, viz, whether the macro must be derived from and 
therefore reducible to, or rather consistent with micro-level behaviours.  The pluralist conclusion of 
the paper is not that research guided by the principle of microfoundations is necessarily wrong, but 
that the exclusion of approaches not guided by that principle is indeed necessarily wrong.  The 
argument is made via an examination of the advantages claimed for dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium models, the relationship between parts and wholes in social science, and the concepts of 
reduction, substrate neutrality, the intentional stance, and hypostatisation.   
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1 Introduction 
The microfoundations of macroeconomics project has attracted considerable critical attention, 
including hundreds of papers and several books, over recent decades.  Yet the matter is now of 
greater importance than ever.  The macroeconomics which practitioners actually do – in leading 
centres for research, including central banks – and the macroeconomics which we teach – at 
postgraduate, and increasingly at undergraduate levels – are overwhelmingly based on the dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) approach – that is, theǇ aƌe ͞ŵiĐƌo-fouŶded͟.  Foƌ the use of 
DSGE models in central banks, see below, and Harrison et al (2005).  The first words of Williamson 
(2002: xxi) – a standard mainstream intermediate undergraduate text in macroeconomics, with 
many subsequent editions – aƌe ͞this ďook folloǁs a ŵodeƌŶ appƌoaĐh to ŵaĐƌoeĐoŶoŵiĐs ďǇ 
building macroeconomic ŵodels fƌoŵ ŵiĐƌoeĐoŶoŵiĐ pƌiŶĐiples͟, while the first words of Wickens 
;ϮϬϭϭ: ϭͿ, a staŶdaƌd postgƌaduate ŵaĐƌoeĐoŶoŵiĐs teǆt, aƌe ͞ModeƌŶ eĐoŶoŵiĐs seeks to eǆplaiŶ 
the aggƌegate eĐoŶoŵǇ usiŶg theoƌies ďased oŶ stƌoŶg ŵiĐƌoeĐoŶoŵiĐ fouŶdatioŶs͟.   
The present paper makes a number of comments on the microfoundations project.  The next section 
locates the origin of the project in the postwar neoclassical synthesis, and addresses, and rejects, the 
usual assumption that the approach is rooted in the Lucas critique of econometric policy evaluation.  
The Smets-Wouters model is briefly considered as an example, and the advantages claimed for it by 
the European Central Bank (ECB) are appraised.  A second substantive section analyses the 
microfoundations approach in relation to an underlying methodological approach, namely 
methodological individualism, and suggests that both approaches share an ambiguity regarding the 
relation between micro and macro.  The seĐtioŶ ĐoŶĐludes ǁith a disĐussioŶ of WatkiŶs͛s ͞half-ǁaǇ͟ 
aŶd ͞ƌoĐk-ďottoŵ͟ eǆplaŶatioŶs, aŶd of top-down versus bottom-up methodological stances.   A 
further substantive section addresses the relationship between wholes and parts in social science, 
drawing on the concepts of substrate neutrality and the intentional stance due to Daniel Dennett.  
The relevance of the concept of hypostatisation is explained and the standpoint of Mises and Nagel 
on hypostatisation is contrasted with that of Smith, Marx, Hayek, Dawkins, Toynbee and Dennett.  
The final substantive section addresses the use of the concepts of equilibrium and the 
representative agent, arguing that a number of key assumptions required for tractability are 
essentially ad hoc.  A final section draws the conclusion that while the use of microfoundations for 
oŶe͛s ƌeseaƌĐh is a legitiŵate stƌategǇ, the use of a requirement for microfoundations to police the 
research of others imposes heavy costs.   
 
2 History and importance of microfoundations 
This section will give a very brief statement of the historical origin of the topic – brief as most of it is 
very well known – and some discussion on the importance of the topic today.  That significance lies 
in that most modern mainstream macro is based on DSGE, and, although the microfoundations issue 
long pre-dates DSGE, it is DSGE which is regarded as the microfoundation of mainstream 
macroeconomics today.  We will therefore have to identify the relationship between DSGE models 
and microfoundations.   
It is generally thought that in the postwar period neoclassical microeconomics fused with Keynesian 
macroeconomics to constitute the neoclassical synthesis.  This is a simplification.  The ͞Ŷeoclassical 
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microeconomics͟ referred to here is the Marshallian partial-equilibrium approach, and the 
͞Keynesian macroeconomics͟, a bowdlerised, neoclassical re-iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of soŵe of KeǇŶes͛s 
ideas.  But there is another trend which, like Marshallian partial equilibrium, emerged from the 
marginalist revolution of the late-nineteenth century, namely Walrasian general equilibrium theory.  
PaƌtlǇ ďeĐause Walƌas͛s Elements of Pure Economics was published in French, and partly because it 
was couched in a mathematical formalism for which the profession was not yet ready, this 
framework for thought about the economy had remained relatively obscure.  After the Second 
World War, a number of factors, including the use made of general equilibrium arguments by the 
socialist side in the socialist calculation debate, the greater mathematisation of the discipline, and 
the translation of the Elements into English, prepared the ground for a significant and rapid 
improvement in its profile.  Since general equilibrium is an attempt to theorise the economy as a 
whole, it can be viewed as an alternative, or at least an alternative to, macroeconomics.  There 
were, therefore, a microeconomic trend, and two macroeconomic trends in play:  
Around the mid-1950s two more or less separate approaches existed to studying economy-
wide phenomena: general equilibrium theory and (Keynesian) macroeconomics … The 
neoclassical synthesis reconciled general equilibrium theory and (Keynesian) 
macroeconomics by giving each of them its own domain of applicability: macroeconomics 
(with its assumption of sticky money wages) gives an accurate description of the economy in 
the short run, while long-run developments of the economy were considered to be 
adequately described by the general equilibrium approach.  (Janssen, 2008: 2-3)  
However, this synthesis led to dissatisfaction.  The sticky money prices of the one contradicted the 
market-clearing assumptions of the other; moreover the generally accepted tenet of methodological 
individualism that the macro must at least be consistent with individual decision-making suggested 
that the Walrasian approach was in some sense more basic.  According to Janssen (2008: 3) this was 
the trigger for the quest for microfoundations – the search for a description of agent-level behaviour 
from which aggregate-level consequences could be derived. The solution which the profession has 
converged on is DSGE modelling with representative agents, and the school of thought which has 
adopted this solution, following the merger of the New Keynesian and Real Business Cycle schools of 
thought, has been called the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS):  
the NNS models have become the standard workhorse foƌ ŵoŶetaƌǇ poliĐǇ aŶalǇsis … 
Bayesian NNS models … combine a sound, microfounded structure suitable for policy 
analysis with a good probabilistic description of the observed data and good forecasting 
performance.  (Smets & Wouters, 2007: 587)  
The Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976) is often regarded as an important step in the development of the 
microfoundations project and is still frequently referred to in support of a micro-founded approach, 
so it warrants discussion here.  The problem is that the Lucas critique is a critique of inductive-
theory-based empirical models.  It is not a critique of any theory of macroeconomic entities.  Such 
entities are assumed not to exist and ignored in the critique.  So what it does say – that observed 
macro-level regularities cannot be assumed to remain regular in the event of a change in the rules of 
the game, such as a change in government fiscal or monetary policy – is perfectly reasonable; it is 
ǁhat it doesŶ͛t saǇ – whether macro entities can exist – which for us is the real point.  LuĐas͛s 
critique is essentially a syllogism (Lucas, 1976: 41).  The ŵajoƌ pƌeŵiss is that ͞the structure of an 
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econometric model consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents͟ – this is ǁhat is ͞given͟, 
what he can assume that his audience will agree with.  But it is this major premiss that already 
impounds microfoundations, not the remainder of the syllogism, which merely adds that a change in 
policy will change those decision rules, so the model will change – so doŶ͛t try to forecast the effect 
of a policy change using historical data which assume that the policy has not changed.  The major 
premiss saǇs that ͞the stƌuĐtuƌe of the eĐoŶoŵetƌiĐ ŵodel͟ ;that is, our model of macro 
pheŶoŵeŶaͿ ͞ĐoŶsists of͟ ;is fouŶded iŶ, is completely reducible toͿ ͞optiŵal deĐisioŶ ƌules of 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ ageŶts͟ ;the ŵiĐƌofouŶdatioŶ of the ŵaĐƌo pheŶoŵeŶaͿ.   
The importance of the microfoundations issue is very simply that modern mainstream 
macroeconomics is based entirely on DSGE models.  And DSGE in turn is synonymous with 
microfoundations.  GeŶeƌal eƋuiliďƌiuŵ theoƌǇ ͞is ĐoeǆteŶsiǀe ǁith the theoƌǇ of the 
microfoundations of ŵaĐƌoeĐoŶoŵiĐs͟ ;WeiŶtƌauď, 1977: 1-2).  ͞D“GE … ŵodels aƌe ďuilt oŶ 
ŵiĐƌoeĐoŶoŵiĐ fouŶdatioŶs͟ ;Sbordone et al, 2010: 23).   
 
An interesting example can be seen on the ECB webpage relating to the research of the ECB (ECB, 
nd1).  Links are provided to pages discussing four models, and to a report evaluating the research 
Đaƌƌied out at the ďaŶk.  The latteƌ foƌegƌouŶds the ͞stellar example͟ of ͞the new area-wide dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model, used for producing ECB forecasts and policy simulations͟ 
(Freedman, et al, 2011: 31).  Three of the four models mentioned are described as micro-founded.  
One such is a model developed by Frank Smets and Raf Wouters, in an article entitled ͞AŶ estiŵated 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the Euro aƌea͟ (Smets & Wouters, 2003).  By the 
middle of the last decade this model ǁas ƌegaƌded as ͞a ŵodeƌŶ ǁoƌkhoƌse aŶd ďeŶĐhŵaƌk ŵodel 
foƌ aŶalǇziŶg ŵoŶetaƌǇ aŶd ﬁsĐal poliĐǇ͟ ;Uhlig, ϮϬϬϳ: 3), and it is now used routinely by central 
banks around the world, including the Federal Reserve and the ECB.  (A senior central bank 
researcher, who must remain anonymous, complained to me in 2005 that the only model permitted 
at his place of work was a DSGE model with a representative agent.)   
 
The Smets-Wouters model, according to the ECB webpage (ECB, nd2), ĐoŵďiŶes ͞a rigorous 
microeconomic derivation of the behavioural equations of macro models with an empirically 
plausible calibration͟, aŶd offeƌs thƌee ŵaiŶ advantages – advantages which are worth dwelling on:  
  
1. ͞TheǇ [sc microfoundations] provide a theoretical discipline on the structure of the model 
that is being estimated, which may be particularly helpful in those cases where the data 
themselves are not very informative, for example regarding the long-run behaviour of the 
economy or because there has been a regime change. 
2. ͞BeiŶg aďle to ƌelate the ƌeduĐed-form parameters to deeper structural parameters makes 
the use of the model for policy analysis more appropriate, i.e. less subject to the Lucas 
critique, as those structural parameters are less likely to change in response to changes in 
policy regime. 
3. ͞MiĐƌo-founded models may provide a more suitable framework for analysing the optimality 
of various policy strategies as the utility of the agents in the economy can be taken as a 
ŵeasuƌe of ǁelfaƌe͟ (ECB, nd2).   
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This neatly summarises the rationale for adopting microfounded – ie DSGE – models.  They provide a 
modelling structure where the data, when allowed to speak for themselves, fail to say anything very 
much, they avoid the Lucas critique, and they provide a basis for estimating the desirability of policy.  
Let͛s ĐoŶsideƌ these iŶ tuƌŶ.  We haǀe alƌeadǇ seeŶ that the LuĐas ĐƌitiƋue has ŶothiŶg to saǇ oŶ the 
existence of macro entities worthy of consideration in their own right, but assumes that modellers 
will adopt a microfoundations approach.  The assertion is that these ͞structural͟ parameters – ie the 
tastes and preferences of households and the technology available to firms – are ͞deepeƌ͟, ie more 
rooted in agent behaviour than ͞ad hoc͟ atheoretical econometric parameters.  The first point, that 
ŵiĐƌofouŶdatioŶs ͞pƌoǀide a theoƌetiĐal disĐipliŶe͟ aŶd ŵaǇ ďe helpful for looking at the long run or 
examining cases of ͞ƌegiŵe ĐhaŶge͟ is esseŶtiallǇ the saŵe poiŶt.  The Đlaiŵ is that ͞ad hoĐ͟ ŵodels 
may be unable to say anything about the long run, and may be misleading if there has been a regime 
change.  Micro-founded models can point towards long-run trends and should not be vulnerable to 
regime changes – that is, they avoid the Lucas critique.   
The final point, that micro-founded models provide a basis for comparing the optimality of 
alternative policies is set out clearly by Woodford:  
A second advantage of proceeding from explicit microeconomic foundations is that in this 
case, the welfare of private agents – as indicated by the utility functions that underlie the 
stƌuĐtuƌal ƌelatioŶs of oŶe͛s ŵodel of the tƌaŶsŵissioŶ ŵeĐhaŶisŵ [of ŵoŶetaƌǇ poliĐǇ] – 
provides a natural objective in terms of which alternative policies should be evaluated.  
(Woodford, 2003: 12) 
Woodford spells this out in Ch ϲ, ͞IŶflatioŶ, “taďilizatioŶ aŶd Welfaƌe͟: 
An important advantage of using a model founded upon private-sector optimization to 
analyze the consequences of alternative policy rules is that there is a natural welfare 
criterion in the context of such a model, provided by the preferences of private agents, 
which are displayed in the structural relations that determine the effects of alternative 
policies.  Such a utility-based approach to welfare analysis has long been standard in the 
theory of public finance.  It is not too common in analyses of monetary policy, perhaps 
because it is believed that the main concerns of monetary stabilization policy are assumed 
away in models with explicit micro-foundations.  But we have seen [in previous chapters] 
that ŵodels fouŶded oŶ iŶdiǀidual optiŵizatioŶ ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŶstƌuĐted that … alloǁ foƌ ƌealistiĐ 
effects of monetary policy upon real variables. (Woodford, 2003: 382) 
Wren-Lewis comments on this:  
Woodfoƌd͛s appƌoaĐh to deƌiǀiŶg the oďjeĐtiǀes of ďeŶeǀoleŶt poliĐǇ ŵakeƌs has ďeeŶ 
immediately adopted in the literature, such that papers now routinely use this approach in 
deriving policy objectives. This is despite the fact that such derivations may result in policy 
objectives that are highly unrealistic, because the models from which they derive generally 
contain no unemployment and no bankruptcies.  Wren-Lewis (2011: 131) 
Not only are the models unrealistic in the sense Wren-Lewis describes, relating to the assumptions 
of the model, but they are also unrealistic in the Friedmanian sense that they do not make good 
predictions: according to a recent Bank of England Working Paper discussing the BaŶk͛s forecasting 
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platform ͞the absolute forecast performance of DSGE models and their competitors is poor. In terms 
of their ability to forecast individual variables, like GDP and inflation, these models typically fail to 
beat simple univariate statistical models͟ ;Burgess, et al, 2013: 7).  According to Dotsey, writing in a 
journal of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, ͞at short horizons (one quarter), DSGE models 
do about as well as purely statistical procedures when forecasting output and inflation, but at 
horizons of one year, they do somewhat better … However, forecasts that use various model 
restrictions in forming priors still generally outperform those from DSGE models͟ ;DotseǇ, ϮϬϭϯ: 14 
and n7).   
The lack of realism of DSGE models makes them highly unsuitable for policy evaluation.  Moreover, 
the argument that the utility function that underlies the structural parameters of a model provides a 
basis for the examination of social welfare is erroneous.  These utility functions are not derived from 
the behaviour of specific individuals, but posited as the property of a single individual to which the 
economy as a whole has been reduced.  That means that they are quite divorced from the wants and 
needs of any really existing individuals in the economy.    
Moreover, this habitual mode of presentation of the matter – one in which microfoundations merely 
offer ͞advantages͟ – is disingenuous.  What is much more worrying is that the requirement of 
microfoundations acts as a shibboleth, facilitating a policing function.  The criterion of the presence 
of microfoundations can be used to ensure that only the orthodox get published and are attended 
to.  Wren-Lewis mentions an unnamed conference he had atteŶded ͞within the microfoundations 
modelling community͟: 
The concern expressed at the conference … was not that papers that included non-
microfounded elements were mislabelled, but that these papers should not have been 
discussed alongside fully microfounded models. Typically the argument would be that 
serious academic analysis should be restricted to fully microfounded models, and that any 
hybrid models should be reserved for discussion elsewhere.  (Wren-Lewis, 2011: 137) 
Foƌ eǆaŵple, ͞papers analysing inflation inertia should only be discussed in (the better) academic 
circles after the microfoundations for such behaviour have been worked out͟.  So microfoundations 
are, or at least on this view should be, ƌeƋuiƌed as a pƌeƌeƋuisite foƌ the ͞seƌious͟ disĐussion of a 
ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛s ǁoƌk.  Wren-Lewis considers at length the example of price rigidity.  The problem here 
was that, despite empirical evidence that such rigidities existed, and acceptance by economists that 
that was a very relevant consideration for macroeconomic models, price rigidities were seen as 
ĐoŶtƌadiĐtiŶg the assuŵptioŶ of ƌatioŶal iŶdiǀidual ďehaǀiouƌ: ͞Why did agents write fixed price 
contracts, when it appeared to make them worse off? The argument that such contracts existed in 
reality did not appear forceful enough: internal consistency overrides external consistency.͟ ;WƌeŶ-
Lewis, 2011: 139).  The consequence was that there was a hiatus of more than two decades before it 
became respectable to include price rigidity in mainstream models.  Only once thoroughly 
microfounded models with price-rigidity had been demonstrated, starting with a 1995 paper by 
Obstfeld and Rogoff, was such an approach considered respectable. 
Thus mainstream economics partitions macroeconomic research activity into two kinds: 
ŵiĐƌofouŶded ŵodels, ƌegaƌdless of theiƌ distaŶĐe fƌoŵ ƌealitǇ, aƌe sĐieŶtifiĐ, ǁhile ͞ad hoĐ͟ ŵodels, 
that is, everything else, regardless of their proximity to reality, are conjectures, which may or may 
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not lead to scientific theory to the extent that, over time, they are discovered to be amenable to 
being microfounded.     
It is worth pursuing this a bit further.  The overall conclusion of Wren-Lewis is that internal 
consistency has taken a central position in the development of macroeconomics:  
the dominant approach in macroeconomics … appear[s] to adopt a clear methodological 
approach, which promotes internal consistency above external consistency as a necessary 
condition of admissibility … macromodelling based on microfoundations represents a 
methodological position that is clearly distinct from other approaches in macroeconomics. In 
particular, this type of modelling elevates internal consistency to a necessary condition of 
admissibility.  In contrast, external consistency, in the sense of conformability with empirical 
evidence, is desirable … but it is not essential.… The key to the rapid adoption of Woodfoƌd͛s 
approach is that it avoids an internal inconsistency that might otherwise arise between 
different parts of the model.  Thus the realism of these derived social welfare functions is 
not the key issue. They have been immediately adopted because they are internally 
consistent with the rest of the model.  Wren-Lewis (2011: 131) 
Since I will discuss the issue of consistency in the next section it is important to be clear that what 
Wren-Lewis is talking about here is something different.  The consistency that I will discuss in one 
possible interpretation of methodological individualism is that between phenomena and their 
substrate.  The consistency that Wren-Lewis is discussing is that between different parts of a 
theoretical ensemble.  This becomes clearer when he discusses the modelling strategy of the ECB.  
At the core of that strategy is the Smets-Wouteƌs ŵodel.  But ƌeĐall that the ECB͛s ďoast ǁas that 
this strategy combined ͞a ƌigoƌous ŵiĐƌoeĐoŶoŵiĐ deƌiǀatioŶ of the ďehaǀiouƌal eƋuatioŶs of ŵaĐƌo 
models with an empirically plausible calibration͟.  The calibration of the Smets-Wouters model 
involves Bayesian estimation of the relevant parameters of the model, 
However, estimation is not allowed to immediately modify the theoretical structure and 
dynamics of the model, as it could do in a structural econometric model for example.  
Instead estimation follows the RBC tradition where data dynamics not captured by the 
theory is ascribed to unexplained shocks, which as a result can be highly persistent. This, 
together with tight priors on estimated parameters, ensures that empirical evidence does 
Ŷot Đoŵpƌoŵise the iŶteƌŶal ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ of the ŵodel͛s stƌuĐtuƌe. Peƌhaps lateƌ Ŷeǁ theoƌǇ 
might be developed or applied which could explain this dynamics, but only in a way that 
ensured the internal consistency of the model remained in place. (Wren-Lewis, 2011: 131) 
Moreover this procedure, such that empirics are at all costs prevented from contaminating and 
hence undermining the core, is even clearer in the case of the Bank of England:  
At the ĐeŶtƌe of the BaŶk͛s latest foƌeĐastiŶg ŵodel … is a ͚Đoƌe͛ that is esseŶtiallǇ aŶ 
elaborate DSGE model. Inconsistency with the data is haŶdled ďǇ additioŶal ͚ŶoŶ-Đoƌe͛ 
equations, which relate variables from the ŵodel͛s Đoƌe to the data … Critically, data 
iŶĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ is Ŷot alloǁed to ͚iŶfeĐt͛ the Đoƌe, ďut instead determines the structure of the 
non-core equations. The non-core equations are completely recursive to the DSGE core: 
there is no feedback from non-core variables to the core. In a more traditional structural 
econometric model, there is no distinction between core and non-core, and any additional 
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dynamics suggested in the data would be incorporated diƌeĐtlǇ iŶto the ŵodel͛s eƋuatioŶs. 
IŶ the BaŶk͛s appƌoaĐh the stƌuĐtuƌe of the Đoƌe is protected from suĐh ͚data-ďased͛ 
augmentation.  (Wren-Lewis, 2011: 131-2)  
What Wren-Lewis has uncovered in his discussion of the twenty-year delay in the recognition of 
price stickiness, and the core/non-core distinction invoked by central banks to avoid infection of the 
theoretical core of their models with empirical facts, is an academic discipline which seems prepared 
to go to any lengths to protect the core of the neoclassical paradigm, that is, the principle that the 
economy can be understood by starting with optimising agents and building up.  The same thing can 
be seen to have happened as the discipline came to terms with the criticisms of perfect competition 
brought forward by Austin and Chamberlin.  According to Minsky these views were deemed 
acceptable to the extent that they left profit-maximisation and hence the price system untouched: 
A reason which can be advanced for the ready acceptance by economists of profit-
maximizing behavior, independently of the changes in the market structure which are 
introduced in their analysis, is that profit-maximizing behavior leads naturally to 
mathematics in which derivatives of the difference between total cost and total revenue are 
set equal to zero. In this sense, under profit-maximization the behavior of the competitive 
and non-competitive firm are formally identical – the mathematical set-up is the same.  The 
complexity added by non-competitive firms is resolved by the introduction of the demand 
elasticities confronting the firm at appropriate places in the analysis.  In general equilibrium 
analysis, the existence of monopoly does not lead to any adjustment in the equilibrium 
relations if profit-maximizing is assumed; rather the effect of different degrees of monopoly 
is in the distribution of income and the allocation of resources.  (Minsky, 2004: 100 n 20)   
The emergence of microfoundations as a talisman to facilitate a policing function can be understood 
in this perspective.  The neoclassical mainstream can accept innovations once it is convinced that 
they can be reconciled with its core propositions, in particular, that we can start with rational agents 
who maximise utility and profits, and derive macro results from their behaviour.  Approaches which 
ĐoŶtƌadiĐt this ǀieǁ ĐaŶ ďe desigŶated ͞ad hoĐ͟ aŶd uŶsĐieŶtifiĐ.  As ǁill ďe aƌgued iŶ the Ŷeǆt 
section, this proposition constitutes a strongly reductionist world-view deriving from methodological 
individualism.   
 
3 Analysis of microfoundations  
The microfoundations programme can be understood as an application of an underlying standpoint, 
methodological individualism, widely held to be fundamental to neoclassical economics as well as 
Austrian economics: ͞The quest for microfoundations grew out of the widely felt, but rarely explicitly 
stated, desire to stick to the position of methodological individualism͟ ;JaŶsseŶ, 2008: 1).  Howitt, 
too, speaks of  
the reductionist methodological predisposition that economists of almost all persuasions 
share to some degree, according to which no explanation of economic phenomena is truly 
satisfactory if it does not reduce the phenomena to a question of individual actions by basic 
decision-making units.  (Howitt, 1987) 
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It is this reductionist methodological predisposition – methodological individualism – which requires 
economics, in particular macroeconomics, to have its foundations in microeconomics.  But as the 
literature on methodological individualism shows, there is much ambiguity and confusion concerning 
what it might mean.  In particular, the core principle of methodological individualism can be 
expressed in two apparently similar but actually profoundly different claims: 
A: macro-level phenomena must be derived from, that is, reducible to, micro-level 
phenomena; and  
 B: macro-level phenomena must be consistent with micro-level phenomena. 
Claim B is difficult to argue with: it is not clear what kind of paradigm would be unconcerned by 
inconsistency of this kind.  And indeed the motivation for the bulk of microfounded research work is 
typically expressed in terms of this internal consistency.  Claim A expresses the standpoint, 
sometimes known as atomism, encapsulated in the statement that the whole is the sum of its parts.  
Adopting an admittedly procrustean approach to the use of words, in what follows I shall refer to 
this as reductionism: a reductionist account of something, in this use of the term, regards the thing 
as constituted by its elements taken in isolation.  Claim A is a special case of the looser formulation 
in claim B: if X is reducible to Y, the two are certainly consistent; but consistency does not itself 
entail reducibility.  According to semantic holism, for example, the meaning of a sentence must be 
consistent with the meaning of the individual words, but cannot be reduced to them.  Rather it 
emerges from the way the words relate to each other.  For a reductionist, there is no consistency 
beyond reduction, but for a non-reductionist there is.  There is considerable debate amongst 
philosophers as to whether or not apparent instances of such emergence, as the putative existence 
of irreducible entities is called, refute reductionism (defined in this sense).  It is therefore at the very 
least unwarranted and premature for economists to assume that that debate is over and that 
reductionism is necessarily correct.   
The microfoundations programme inherits this ambivalence from methodological individualism.  It is 
logically possible to advocate a non-reductionist microfoundations approach, where the 
requirement to demonstrate microfoundations only means that individual behaviour must be shown 
to be consistent with the macro entities posited by the theory adopted.  The micro in this case is 
sufficient, but not necessary, for the macro to be possible.  A researcher has ticked this particular 
box when he has shown that there is a possible constellation of individual-level behaviours which 
could underpin the posited macro entities of the model, without being required to show that it is 
that very constellation which really does underlie the macro phenomena addressed by the model.    
We have then, two possible stances.  Either macro models need to be microfounded, that is, shown 
to be an inevitable outcome of a specific constellation of micro behaviours – this is the approach of 
DSGE modelling today.  Or macro models need to shown to be consistent with at least one 
constellation of possible micro behaviours.  This is the alternative – there is no supposition that any 
constellation of micro behaviours will necessarily lead to this rather than that macro outcome.  
Multiple outcomes are potentially consistent with a given set of micro behaviours.   
There is another dimension to be considered.  This involves both a whole-and-parts aspect and a 
time aspect.  It may be that there is a difference between what a science as a whole should aim at, 
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and what should be required of an individual researcher or study.  As is well known, Watkins 
distinguishes between such ͞half-way͟ and ultimate oƌ ͞ƌoĐk-ďottoŵ͟ explanations:  
There may be unfinished or half-way explanations of large-scale social phenomena (say, 
inflation) in terms of other large-scale phenomena (say, full employment); but we shall not 
have arived [sic] at rock-bottom explanations of such large-scale phenomena until we have 
deduced an account of them from statements about the dispositions, beliefs, resources, and 
inter-relations of individuals (Watkins, 1957: 106).   
It may be that we all want macroeconomics as a whole to be well founded, in the sense of being 
consistent with a possible constellation of micro-level behaviours, and, indeed, that we will regard 
the science as incomplete until it isolates the true micro-foundation.  But, if ǁe adopt WatkiŶs͛s 
stance here, that does not in any way imply that any specific enquiry is defective if it fails to attain to 
͞rock-bottom͟ explanation.  A theoretically compelling and empirically supported theory can still be 
enlightening without any micro-level support whatever.  However, the absence of a reference to the 
corresponding micro-level theory will always be felt as an absence, a lacuna that in due course needs 
to be addressed.  The tension here is between the individual study and the science as a whole; it is 
itself a micro-macro dichotomy.   
A further issue which is clearly related to, and indeed sometimes conflated with, the issues of 
microfoundations and methodological individualism, should be mentioned here.  As just argued, we 
might well want a macroeconomics which is shown to be consistent with a constellation of micro 
behaviours, and we will want to find out what those behaviours are.  This implies that it is legitimate 
to work towards this reconciliation from either direction – top-down or bottom-up.  The finished 
theory, if ever a theory can be finished, will be a unity of bottom-up and top-down explanation.  In 
the process of developing that theory, top-down and bottom-up theorising and explanations will 
both contribute.  That top-down and bottom-up approaches are in principle equally valid is 
eǆeŵplified ďǇ FƌiedŵaŶ͛s ;ϭϵϳϲ: ϯϭϲͿ stateŵeŶt that ǁhile ďoth he aŶd KeǇŶes used a top-down 
methodology, most Keynesians and monetarists used a bottom-up approach.  Similarly, Trotsky 
(1973: 233-234) illustrates a discussion of Marxist notions of science by means of equally approving 
references to the top-down psychological approach of Freud and the bottom-up research strategy of 
Pavlov.  Herbert Simon, too, ĐoŶtƌasts ͞the usual conception of the sciences as building upward from 
elementary particles, through atoms and molecules to cells, organs and organisms͟ ǁith ͞[t]he 
actual history͟, which ͞has unfolded, as often as not, in the opposite direction, from top down͟ 
(Simon 1996: 172).  The implication is that both procedures are to be regarded as legitimate 
scientific research strategies.  My own view here is that the choice of top-down or bottom-up 
heuristic is a wholly pragmatic matter: there is no issue of principle here, no golden key to 
knowledge of the world.  The methodologically pluralistic statements of Simon, Trotsky, and 
Friedman are therefore to be endorsed.   
 
4 The relationship between parts and wholes in social science 
The key question I wish to focus on, which underlies the microfoundations debate, concerns the 
relationship between parts and wholes.  I would like to explore this by drawing on the work of Daniel 
Dennett on the ͞intentional stance͟.  If ǁe adopt WatkiŶs͛s distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ uŶfiŶished aŶd ƌoĐk-
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bottom explanations, we can, according to Dennett, make gigantic strides towards helpful and 
scientific – but not rock-bottom – explanations by invoking the intentional stance:   
when they [sc the designers of a VCR] engage in reverse engineering – of some other 
ŵaŶufaĐtuƌeƌ͛s VC‘, foƌ iŶstaŶĐe – theǇ aǀail theŵselǀes … of ǁhat I Đall the intentional 
stance – they try to figure out what the designers had in mind.  They treat the artefact as a 
product of reasoned design development, a series of choices among alternatives, in which 
the decisions reached were those deemed best by the designers.  Thinking about the 
postulated functions of the parts is making assumptions about the reasons for their 
pƌeseŶĐe, aŶd this ofteŶ peƌŵits oŶe to ŵake giaŶt leaps of iŶfeƌeŶĐe that fiŶesse oŶe͛s 
ignorance of the underlying physics, or lower-level design elements of the object (Dennett, 
1995: 229-230)
1
.   
It is interesting to dwell on the terms in this passage which Dennett chooses to emphasise.  The 
intentional stance focuses on what the designer had in mind, what he chose, what he decided, what 
he deemed best, and his reasons.  The parallels with neoclassical economics are striking, although of 
Đouƌse, iŶ the déŶoueŵeŶt DeŶŶett͛s desigŶeƌ tuƌŶs out to ďe the DaƌǁiŶiaŶ eǀolutioŶaƌǇ algoƌithŵ, 
and no human designer at all.   
DeŶŶett͛s appƌoaĐh heƌe is ĐoŵpletelǇ ĐoŶsistent with “iŵoŶ͛s ͞pragmatic holism͟: ͞IŶ the faĐe of 
complexity, an in-pƌiŶĐiple ƌeduĐtioŶist ŵaǇ ďe at the saŵe tiŵe a pƌagŵatiĐ holist͟ ;“iŵoŶ, ϭϵϲϮ: 
468).  This is a standpoint that I reject.  In my view a bottom-up explanation of organic entities in 
terms of particles and subordinate components of the thing studied will always be incomplete 
without an account of purpose, the reason the part is there, the function of the part in the whole.  
Where there is an organic relationship, the whole is a precondition for the explanation of the parts.  
In these cases it makes sense to say that the micro is macrofounded.   
This is Ŷot to saǇ that ĐoŶgeƌies doŶ͛t eǆist: clearly they do.  Marx famously compared mid-
nineteenth century peasant small holdings in France to potatoes in a sack (Marx, 1937).  And, of 
course, where there are purposes, they do not override or displace causation but work through 
causation.  The important bit of the job is to discover where there are top-down and bottom-up 
explanations and successfully to marry them up.  “o iŶ DeŶŶett͛s aĐĐouŶt, the ƌole of the intentions 
considered by the intentional stance are not auxiliary, a helpful short-cut, merely ͞fiŶessiŶg Ǉouƌ 
igŶoƌaŶĐe of the goƌǇ ŵeĐhaŶiĐal details͟ ;DeŶŶett, ϭϵϵϱ: 359), but an essential part of explanation.  
EǆplaŶatioŶ is iŶĐoŵplete ǁithout it, ǁhateǀeƌ the leǀel of detail of oŶe͛s kŶoǁledge of the 
substrate level may be.   
Dennett captures this in his discussion of substrate neutrality:  
The procedure for long division works equally well with pencil or pen, paper or parchment, 
neon lights or skywriting, using any symbol system you like.  The power of the procedure is 
due to its logical structure, not the causal powers of the materials used in the instantiation, 
just so long as those causal powers permit the prescribed steps to be followed exactly. 
(Dennett, 1995: 50-51)   
                                                          
1
 Throughout the paper emphasis in cited passages is exactly as in the original source.   
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The Đlaiŵ I aŵ ŵakiŶg heƌe is that just as ŵatheŵatiĐs oƌ, iŶ DeŶŶett͛s aƌgument, evolution, is a 
substrate-neutral algorithmic process, so is economic activity, and indeed not coincidentally, since 
that activity can itself be seen as an evolutionary process.  But that takes us too far from our present 
theme.  That theme is the relationship between macro and micro, and the Dennettian argument is 
that the macro – inflation, unemployment, and so on – is instantiated in the micro – a substrate of 
human agents.  Just as Dennett says that there are some requirements for a substrate for long 
division, there are requirements for the human substrate of economic phenomena – posited 
macroeconomic entities must be consistent with the causal powers of the human substrate.  But, 
given that constraint, they may be implemented in a wide range of agents – from agents with limited 
rationality driven by rules of thumb, to perfectly rational optimisers, for example, if those macro 
level entities are to any degree substrate-neutral.  If so, then it will in general not be possible to 
deduce or derive the macro from the micro.  Rather, the micro behaviours observed will be 
determined by the macro phenomena instantiated in them.    
In discussing the behaviour of a person we could never be satisfied by an account, however 
complete, in terms of molecules and cells, let alone of fermions and bosons – even though we know 
that the person consists of nothing else.  We ǁould Ŷeed to kŶoǁ aďout the peƌsoŶ͛s ideŶtitǇ, his 
past, his goals, his preferences.  While it is of course the case that every aspect of the individual is 
underpinned by material substance, by organic activity at the cellular and system level, knowing 
about these subordinate levels, to any desired level of detail, would still leave us asking for more, 
asking about the beliefs and motivations of the individual.  This is what Hayek seizes on as the 
foundation for the claim that his methodologiĐal appƌoaĐh is ͞individualist͟.  We can intuit what it is 
like to be a person because we ourselves are persons – we can draw on Verstehen:  
it is the concepts and views held by individuals which are directly known to us, and form the 
elements from which ǁe ŵust ďuild up, as it ǁeƌe, the ŵoƌe Đoŵpleǆ pheŶoŵeŶa … it is the 
attitudes of individuals which are the familiar elements and by the combination of which we 
try to reproduce the complex phenomena, the results of individual actions, which are much 
less known.  (Hayek, 1979: 65; see also Simpson, 2013: 7) 
But this is only the start.  This is an application of the intentional stance to other people.  But they 
are not the only potential agents in the world.  We can understand the purpose of things because we 
have purposes.  We can think about the meaning of the AŶtikǇtheƌa ŵeĐhaŶisŵ, oƌ PaleǇ͛s ǁatĐh, 
because we know what it means to mean something.  Whatever the provenance of either 
mechanism, we could not be satisfied by an account exclusively in terms of the component parts, 
the wheels and pinions and gears.  We would have to be told how those parts interacted to achieve 
the purpose of the whole.  For Dennett  
There is no substitute for the intentional stance.  Either you adopt it, and explain the pattern 
by finding the semantic-level
2
 facts, or you will forever be baffled by the regularity – the 
                                                          
2
 “ǇŶtaǆ is aďout the ƌules foƌ ŵaŶipulatiŶg ǁoƌds, seŵaŶtiĐs aďout theiƌ ŵeaŶiŶg.  DeŶŶett͛s disĐussioŶ of 
what West Side Story and Romeo and Juliet have in common illustrates the point: ǁhat theǇ shaƌe is ͞Ŷot a 
stƌiŶg of EŶglish ĐhaƌaĐteƌs, Ŷot eǀeŶ a seƋueŶĐe of pƌopositioŶs … What is iŶ ĐoŵŵoŶ, of Đouƌse, is Ŷot a 
syntactic property or system of properties but a semantic property or system of properties: the story, not the 
teǆt; the ĐhaƌaĐteƌs aŶd theiƌ peƌsoŶalities, Ŷot theiƌ Ŷaŵes aŶd speeĐhes … “o it is oŶlǇ at the leǀel of 
intentional objects, once we have adopted the intentional stance, that we can describe these common 
properties͟ ;DeŶŶett, ϭϵϵϱ: ϯϱϲͿ.   
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causal regularity – that is ŵaŶifestlǇ theƌe … EǀeŶ if Ǉou ĐaŶ desĐƌiďe, iŶ ŵatĐhless 
microdetail, every causal fact in the history of every giraffe who has ever lived, unless you go 
up a leǀel oƌ tǁo aŶd ask ͞WhǇ?͟ … Ǉou ǁill Ŷeǀeƌ ďe aďle to explain the manifest 
regularities, such as the fact that giraffes have come to have long necks.  (Dennett, 
1995: 421) 
CleaƌlǇ, DeŶŶett heƌe is Ŷot positiŶg a ĐoŶsĐious desigŶeƌ of the giƌaffe͛s ŶeĐk; rather the designer is 
the Darwinian evolutionary process.  Now the big issue is, whether indeed there are causally 
efficacious entities operating at social levels above that of the individual human agent.  For some it is 
obvious that there are not, for others equally obvious that there are.  This is the paradigmatic chasm 
across which we are trying to build bridges.  The core issue here is that of hypostatisation.  
Hypostatisation is the attribution of substance or real existence to concepts or abstractions 
(Greaves, 1974: glossary entry for hypostasis).  Mises sets out the view that hypostatisation is a 
mental error with great clarity in a subsection of The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science 
eŶtitled ͞The Pitfalls of HǇpostatizatioŶ͟: 
The worst enemy of clear thinking is the propensity to hypostatize, i.e., to ascribe substance 
or real existence to mental constructs or concepts. 
In the sciences of human action the most conspicuous instance of this fallacy is the way in 
which the term society is employed by various schools of pseudo sĐieŶĐe … soĐietǇ itself is 
neither a substance, nor a power, nor an acting being.  OŶlǇ iŶdiǀiduals aĐt … “oĐietǇ does 
not exist apart from the thoughts and actions of people. It does not have "interests" and 
does not aim at anything. The same is valid for all other collectives (Mises, 1962: 78). 
Kant, too, aĐĐused his iŶtelleĐtual aŶtagoŶists of ͞a delusion in which they hypostatise something 
that exists merely in thought – that is, they treat it as a ƌeal oďjeĐt eǆistiŶg … outside the thinking 
subject͟ ;KaŶt, 2010: 191).  Nagel agrees.  Pointing out that the ͞extension͟ of, for example, the 
French Enlightenment (that is, ǁhateǀeƌ it is that the phƌase ͞the FƌeŶĐh EŶlighteŶŵeŶt͟ ƌefeƌs to) 
͞ĐaŶŶot ďe aƌtiĐulated ǁith uŶliŵited detail͟, he suggests that this failure may lead to a ͞hypostatic͟ 
conception of it as a causally efficacious unitary whole:  
such a hypostatic transformation of a complex system of relations between individual 
human beings into a self-subsisting entity capable of exercising causal influence is the 
aŶalogue of ǀitalistiĐ doĐtƌiŶes iŶ ďiologǇ … suĐh hǇpostatiĐ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶs haǀe ďeeŶ 
useless as guides iŶ iŶƋuiƌǇ aŶd steƌile as pƌeŵises iŶ eǆplaŶatioŶs … [T]he ŵethodologiĐal 
assumption that all collective terms designate either groups of human individuals or 
patterns of behaviour leads to a more fruitful way of identifying the extensions of such 
terms than does the perplexing hypostasis of mysterious super-individuals.  
(Nagel, 1979: 537) 
So, for Nagel, the answer to hypostatisation is, precisely, methodological individualism.   
For writers as diverse as Marx, Hayek, Keynes, Dawkins, Toynbee and Dennett, however, it is pretty 
ŵuĐh a giǀeŶ that suĐh ͞super-individual͟ entities exist, and the issue is to identify them and explain 
their working.  For Keynes the class of parasitic rentiers and the institutional structure of atomistic 
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capitalism are creations of society which served their own interests, interests which now diverge 
from ours (Denis, 2002b).  For Hayek, the networks of social relations within which individuals are 
embedded undergo a process of natural selection such that the traditions we inherit embody the 
ƌules ǁe ŵust folloǁ, eǀeŶ if ǁe doŶ͛t uŶdeƌstaŶd theŵ.  Foƌ HaǇek, ǀalue ͞ĐaŶ oŶlǇ ďe understood 
as the deteƌŵiŶaŶt of ǁhat people ŵust do to ŵaiŶtaiŶ the oǀeƌall stƌuĐtuƌe͟ of the sǇsteŵ ǁithiŶ 
the individual is embedded (Hayek, 1983: 36).  Traditions here clearly exist and follow their own 
logic.  For Hayek, this logic is to act in our interest, but no mechanism is specified which guarantees 
this (Denis, 2002a).  For Toynbee, the unit of social analysis is the civilisation, the ͞intelligible field of 
study͟ (Toynbee, 1972: 45).  The activities which take place within the civilisation are directed 
towards the maintenance of the civilisation, for example, the sustenance of a minority, including the 
soldiers, administrators and priests, who are free from the necessity of producing the material 
requirements of the society (Toynbee, 1972: 44).  For Dawkins and Dennett, the individual is itself a 
hypostatisation: individual organisms are ͞gigantic lumbering robots͟ built by genes to serve as their 
vehicle, but a vehicle which comes to have its own interests, which diverge from those of its creators 
(Dawkins, 1989: 19, 332; Dennett, 1995: 471).  Finally, for Marx, states and capitals are 
hypostatisations of the activity of social individuals, organic social forms which have acquired their 
own interests, opposed to the interest of, and parasitic on, the human substrate of which they are 
formed (Denis, 2011).   
If substrate neutrality applies, then it is not the preferences, technology, and resource constraints 
facing the individual human which matter.  What matters is the properties of the social evolutionary 
algorithmic process which is instantiated in this substrate.  When individuals act socially they are 
implementing plans and decisions of which they care nothing and often do not even know.  For 
Adam “ŵith, the Đapitalist ͞intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by 
an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention͟ (Smith, 1776: IV.ii.9).  
Hayek, too, knows this, and so does Marx.  For these writers the key economic phenomena with 
which we are to deal are the unintended consequences of our self-seeking behaviour.  Those 
consequences are coherent social plans, and it is those plans that must be studied to understand 
what the individuals are doing.   
It is not my purpose here, however, to argue that all or indeed any of these views are correct.  All 
that we need to say is that they are not all obviously incorrect.  The possibility of non-human social 
entities cannot be dismissed in limine, but has to be explored and – if incorrect – refuted in each 
case.  The microfoundations programme as a research strategy is a legitimate approach
3
 for 
individual researchers to adopt.  As shibboleth it is an indefensible means to the exclusion of non-
mainstream approaches to economics.    
 
                                                          
3
 This has statement has been rejected by readers.  An anonymous referee has criticised the statement, saying 
that this legitimacy has not been established – and indeed cannot be established, and another has said that 
͞atomism is treated too leniently͟.  I am not asserting that this is a good research strategy, or one I would 
endorse; rather I am saying that it is up to individual researchers to follow whatever strategy they choose.  I 
am very reluctant to endorse proscriptions on particular research strategies.  It is possible to generate insight 
even within profoundly mistaken paradigms.  Pasteur made his discoveries in the process of attempting to 
refute theories of spontaneous generation, which he regarded as contradicting the Christian doctrine of 
creation.   
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5 Equilibrium and the representative agent 
The DSGE approach is an equilibrium approach and it therefore behoves us to examine the relevance 
of the notion of equilibrium which it expresses to the microfoundations project.  I have already said 
a ďit aďout the ŶeoĐlassiĐal deploǇŵeŶt of the ĐoŶĐept of eƋuiliďƌiuŵ ;DeŶis, ϮϬϬϳͿ, aŶd I ǁoŶ͛t 
ƌepeat that heƌe.  D“GE is also ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ use of ͞ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe ageŶts͟, usually just the one, 
but in some cases a small number of heterogeneous agents, standing for the all the agents in the 
economy.  We explore this below, starting with the representative agent and concluding with 
equilibrium.    
Modern general equilibrium theory is built on the work of such writers as Walras, Ramsey and Arrow 
and Debreu.  It is notable that Walras regarded himself as a scientific socialist (Morishima, 1977: 2) 
while the Ramsey model of 1928 (Ramsey, 1978: 261-281) is a model of the actions to be taken by a 
central planner who wishes to establish the optimal rate of saving for the community (Wickens, 
2011: 2-3).  This suggests a ƌeǀisioŶ of Paul “ǁeezǇ͛s apothegŵ, such that modern neoclassical 
macroeconomics is the economics of socialism, while the economics of such writers as Keynes and 
Marx is the economics of capitalism.  To some extent, it is not that DSGE is wrong, but that it 
happens – as Keynes liked to say about the classical economics of his time – not to describe the 
economy we actually inhabit, namely a capitalist economy.  To be specific, mainstream economics 
treats the economy as one of direct exchange of products for products, use-value for use-value, 
rather than as exchange driven by the needs of capitalist accumulation – iŶ KeǇŶes͛s laŶguage, a ƌeal 
exchange economy rather than a monetary production economy.   
WiĐkeŶs ideŶtifies as the ͞staƌtiŶg poiŶt͟ foƌ the studǇ of D“GE ŵodels a sŵall geŶeƌal eƋuiliďƌiuŵ 
ŵodel ͞ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ kŶoǁŶ as eitheƌ the ‘aŵseǇ ;ϭϵϮϴͿ ŵodel oƌ the ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe-ageŶt ŵodel͟.  
The Ramsey model is a representative-agent model in the sense that a single agent is set the 
optiŵisatioŶ pƌoďleŵ of ĐhoosiŶg the fƌaĐtioŶ of its iŶĐoŵe to saǀe.  This ageŶt is ƌegaƌded as ͞a 
ŶatioŶ͟ ;‘aŵseǇ, ϭϵϳϴ: ϮϲϭͿ, and so can be said to represent all the agents in that economy.  So the 
assumption is that the whole of society can behave as a single individual; viewed as such we can say 
exactly what the nation must do, if the individual agent representing it is a Homo economicus.  Now 
– pace many heterodox critics – it is not wrong to consider what humanity as a whole will do, or 
what it must do in order to behave rationally, in its interaction with the physical world.  Marx does 
this in Chapter 1 of Capital, where he considers the activity of Robinson Crusoe on his island, as he 
allocates his labour between the various activities required to produce the products that he 
consumes.  Marx concludes the paragraph with the very surprising stateŵeŶt that ͞All the ƌelatioŶs 
between Robinson and the objects that form this wealth of his own creation, are here so simple and 
Đleaƌ as to ďe iŶtelligiďle ǁithout eǆeƌtioŶ … AŶd Ǉet those ƌelatioŶs ĐoŶtaiŶ all that is esseŶtial to 
the deteƌŵiŶatioŶ of ǀalue͟ ;Maƌǆ ϭϵϱϰ: ϴϭͿ.  The surprise, and the deep significance of this, is that 
͞ǀalue͟ iŶ Capital (Wert in the German) is ineluctably a social category iŶ Maƌǆ͛s aŶalǇsis – it simply 
cannot apply to the case of the individual producing and consuming use-values, such as Crusoe.  
Robinson, here, is a synecdoche standing for society as a whole.  This is brought out in the 
suďseƋueŶt pages.  IŶ a ͞ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ of fƌee iŶdiǀiduals͟, that is, uŶdeƌ soĐialisŵ, Marx says, ͞[a]ll 
the ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs of ‘oďiŶsoŶ͛s laďouƌ aƌe heƌe ƌepeated, ďut ǁith the diffeƌeŶĐe that theǇ aƌe 
social, instead of individual.  Everything produced by him was exclusively the result of his own 
personal labour, and therefore simply an object of use for himself.  The total product of our 
ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ is a soĐial pƌoduĐt͟ ;Maƌǆ, ϭϵϱϰ: ϴϮ-ϯͿ.  A ͞ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ of fƌee iŶdiǀiduals͟, for Marx, is 
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one in which capitalism has been overcome, a socialist community.  So for Marx, like Walras and 
Ramsey, the isolated individual is a figure standing for society as a whole, when that society is 
conceived as a community of free individuals.    
What neither Marx nor Ramsey did, however, was to extend this normative view of what a (socialist) 
society should do so as to make it a descriptive statement of what a capitalist society actually does.  
That is the approach of the Walrasian tradition issuing iŶ todaǇ͛s DSGE paradigm.   
Turning to the issue of equilibrium, we note that there are two equilibria to consider – short- and 
long-run.  This attempts to graft a Marshallian construct on to the Walrasian framework.  We can 
summarise the DSGE position in the somewhat paradoxical-sounding statement that the economy is 
always in short-run and never in long-run equilibrium.  The economy is in short-run equilibrium by 
defiŶitioŶ.  ͞The eĐoŶoŵǇ is ǀieǁed as ďeiŶg iŶ ĐoŶtiŶuous [shoƌt-run] equilibrium in the sense that, 
giǀeŶ the iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aǀailaďle, people ŵake deĐisioŶs that appeaƌ to ďe optiŵal foƌ theŵ … The 
economy is assumed to be always in short-ƌuŶ eƋuiliďƌiuŵ͟ ;WiĐkeŶs, ϮϬϭϭ: ϭͿ.  This is iƌƌefutaďle: 
whatever obstacles to such a state of affairs may be proposed, can simply be impounded in the 
constraints the agent faces – the individual does not have enough information to act rationally?  No, 
he does the best he can subject to this constraint – by forming expectations rationally, for example.  
He lacks computing power?  Again, he does the best he can – by means of habits, institutions, and so 
on – subject to this constraint.  There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this – a definition cannot be 
wrong, only of greater or lesser utility.  As we will see below, the problems arise when that short-run 
equilibrium is interpreted in a specific way.   
On the definition of short-run equilibrium agents are doing the best they can subject to constraints – 
but that cannot mean that the outcome is optimal in the sense that they have no incentive to 
change their behaviour in subsequent periods.  One constraint might be that in period t – 1 they do 
not know what other agents intend to do in period t.  When period t arrives, the actions of the 
agents, whose intentions other agents had to surmise, are now evident.  Mostly the outturn 
behaviour of others will be different from what the agent had expected; the agent will therefore 
have an incentive to adjust his behaviouƌ to adapt to the Ŷeǁ ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes.  KeǇŶes͛s ͞ďeautǇ 
ĐoŶtest͟ aŶalǇsis iŶ the General Theory (Keynes, 1973: 156) supports this view.  Agents, Keynes says, 
are in the business, not of forecasting the fundamental value of assets, but of forecasting the general 
opiŶioŶ of the geŶeƌal opiŶioŶ of … asset ǀalues iŶ the Ŷeǆt peƌiod.  Theƌe is aŶ iŶfiŶite ƌegƌess 
sepaƌatiŶg the eǆpeĐtatioŶs fƌoŵ the uŶdeƌlǇiŶg fuŶdaŵeŶtals.  This giǀes ƌise to ͞ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal͟ 
values in which the future is assumed to resemble the past (Keynes, 1973: 152), punctuated by 
inherently unpredictable landslides in sentiment caused by waves of optimism and pessimism 
sweeping the investment community.  The standard interpretation of the short-run equilibrium 
which the economy is always in, as one in which there is no incentive for the agent to change his 
behaviour, is an additional, tacit, unsupported, and indeed wholly unwarranted, assumption.   
Turning to the long run, the economy will, in practice, never be in long-ƌuŶ eƋuiliďƌiuŵ as ͞The long 
run, or the steady state, is a mathematical property of the macroeconomic model that describes its 
path ǁheŶ all past shoĐks haǀe fullǇ ǁoƌked thƌough the sǇsteŵ͟.  This ǁill iŶ geŶeƌal Ŷeǀeƌ ďe 
reached as the economy is continually subject to new shoĐks.  ͞It is Ŷot, theƌefoƌe, the eĐoŶoŵǇ that 
is assumed to be in long-ƌuŶ eƋuiliďƌiuŵ, ďut the ŵaĐƌoeĐoŶoŵiĐ ŵodel͟ ;WiĐkeŶs, ϮϬϭϭ: ϭͿ.  The 
long-ƌuŶ eƋuiliďƌiuŵ ĐaŶ ďe ͞eitheƌ a statiĐ eƋuiliďƌiuŵ, iŶ ǁhiĐh all ǀaƌiaďles aƌe ĐoŶstaŶt, oƌ, ŵoƌe 
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generally, a growth equilibrium, in which in the absence of shocks, there is no tendency for the 
eĐoŶoŵǇ to depaƌt fƌoŵ a giǀeŶ path͟ ;WiĐkeŶs, ϮϬϭϭ: ϭͿ.   
This approach makes a number of profound, but tacit, assumptions.  The distinction which Wickens 
makes, between the model and the economy, is well taken.  But the nature of the difference 
between the two is systematically understated.  For Wickens, the economy is in short-run 
equilibrium (so the economy and model coincide in the short run), and the only reason that it is not 
in long-run equilibrium is because the latter is what happens when past shocks have all been 
adjusted to, but in reality new shocks are arriving continually.  However (a) there is no guarantee 
that the short-run equilibrium that the economy is in will gravitate, in the absence of further shocks 
and as adjustment to past ones is completed, to a long-run equilibrium or steady state.  On the 
contrary, there might be no final stopping point, or the system might cycle endlessly or behave 
chaotically.  And (b) it might not be a matter of adjusting to exogenous shocks at all, but of the 
emergence of endogenous change within the system (Simpson, 2013: 6; Denis, 2007).  
These assumptions are made for one reason: tractability.  The consequence is that they are 
essentially ad hoc, not derived from anything more basic.  There is no theoretical reason why the 
economy that the model is supposed to represent will display these features.  The DSGE approach is 
thus guilty of the ad-hocery of which it ĐoŶǀiĐts ͞tƌaditioŶal ŵaĐƌoeĐoŶoŵiĐs͟.  As John King says, in 
this very ĐoŶteǆt, ͞the temptation to slide from the intractable real world into tractable fantasy 
worlds is very difficult to resist͟ ;KiŶg, ϮϬϭϮ: ϮϮϴ; see also Colander et al, 2008: 238). 
 
6 Conclusion 
The paper has made a number of comments on the microfoundations project.  It is suggested that 
the advantages claimed for a micro-founded approach are unconvincing.  This is because the 
alternative in general is wrongly posed as that between DSGE/RBC models, on the one hand, and 
traditional, theoretically inconsistent econometric modelling, on the other.  It is an instance of 
TiŵothǇ GaƌtoŶ Ash͛s apothegŵ that the seleĐtioŶ of the ĐouŶteƌfaĐtual ƋuestioŶ to ďe asked often 
anticipates the desired answer.  The real opportunity cost, however, is the exclusion of such 
theoƌetiĐal ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs as HaǇek͛s theoƌǇ of soĐial eǀolutioŶ, Maƌǆ͛s aŶalǇsis of Đapital as a 
paƌasitiĐ Đoŵpleǆ of soĐial ƌelatioŶs, aŶd KeǇŶes͛s theoƌǇ of aggƌegate deŵaŶd.   
The microfoundations approach is analysed in the paper in relation to methodological individualism, 
suggesting that both approaches share an ambiguity regarding the relation between micro and 
macro.  Does the assertion of a requirement for microfoundations mean, uncontroversially, that the 
macro must be consistent with the micro, or, more demandingly, that the micro must be reducible 
to and derivable from the micro?  The latter is identified as expressing a reductionist or atomistic 
standpoint, such that the whole is just the sum of its parts.  Such a requirement is shown necessarily 
to exclude a vast array of contributions to economic science.  A disĐussioŶ of DaŶiel DeŶŶett͛s 
concepts of substrate neutrality and the intentional stance suggests that such non-reductionist 
approaches cannot be easily dismissed.  Further it is suggested that hypostatisation – the ascription 
of substance and causal efficacy to abstractions – is a key feature of the approaches excluded by the 
requirement of microfoundations, and that it is unreasonable to exclude such approaches in limine.  
Finally, it is argued that the assumptions which microfounded approaches make in connection with 
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the representative agent and the notion of equilibrium at the heart of DSGE show a striking degree 
of ad-hocery – a failure to ground key assumptions required for tractability.  I conclude that the 
adoption of a micro-founded approach to a research project is unexceptionable – its likely success a 
matter for the researcher.  The use of the requirement for microfoundations as a shibboleth, 
policing the research activity of others, however, is to be deplored.   
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